

67

JUN 10 1933

Vol. 30, No. 5

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW PUBLICATIONS

May, 1933

Psychological Bulletin

EDITED BY

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PUBLISHED MONTHLY (EXCEPT AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER)

FOR THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

BY THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW COMPANY

PRINCETON, N. J.

Entered as second-class matter at the post-office at Princeton, N. J., with an additional entry at Albany, N. Y.

Publications of the American Psychological Association

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY

BY ABRAHAM CRONBACH

Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, O.

This survey is to cover the five year period from 1928 to 1932. The extreme diversity of the material will be evident from the classification which we are impelled to adopt. This classification is as follows:

- Psychoanalytic Presentations
- Non-Psychoanalytic Presentations
- Theoretical Studies
- Original Studies
 - Subjects: Children
 - Students
 - Other Young People
 - Adults
 - Special Groups
 - Methods: Statistical
 - Case Studies
 - Introspection, etc.
 - Questionnaires
 - Literary Effusions
 - Topics: Biographical
 - Biblical
 - Otherwise Historical
- Secondary Studies
 - Surveys
 - Text Books
 - Bibliographies
 - Methodologies
 - Criticisms

Practical Studies
For Psychiatrists
For Teachers
For Clergymen
For Faith Healing
Regarding Church Methods
Regarding Prayer

PSYCHOANALYTIC

We begin with those titles in our list by which the psychoanalytic approach is illustrated. Halliday (72) utilizes psychoanalytic concepts when he sees in the mentality of certain religious Christians a species of physical identification with Jesus, or when he points out the masochistic and sadistic suggestions of the crucifixion story or when he traces certain religious eccentricities to certain relationships between parents and children. Psychoanalytic concepts like Oedipus complex, totemism, ambivalence, repression, etc., prove serviceable to Reik (168) in his treatment of the Jewish prayer shawl and of the phylacteries; serviceable likewise to Langer (150, 107) in his discussion of the Jewish door inscription and of the phylacteries. Langer surmises (150) that the inscription capsule symbolizes the male organ of sex where the door betokens the female organ. Also psychoanalytic is Money-Kyrle's volume on sacrifices (124). Sacrifices are interpreted as the gratification of the desire to commit or mentally to repeat the patricide prompted by the hatred commonly felt toward the father by the son. Self punishment for the deed is symbolized by the gift which is brought; a gift stands for mutilation or self destruction. Weatherhead (241) offers psychoanalytic explanations of Peter's dream in Acts 10:9-16 and of Joseph's dream in Genesis 37:5-8. In Peter's dream, the command "Kill and eat," is explicable by Peter's hunger at the time of falling asleep. The permission to eat unclean food implies the admission of Gentiles into the church. The sheaf in Joseph's dream was a phallic symbol and signified numerous offspring and a large strong tribe well able to defend its possessions. Cohen (39) detects in the dream interpretations occupying a certain famous Talmudic page, some anticipations, not to say illustrations, of modern psychoanalytic conjectures.

In No. 60 Ehrich Fromm attempts to account psychoanalytically for the transition from the conception of Jesus the man who, ascending into heaven, became a god to Jesus the god who, coming down from heaven, turned into a man. At first the followers of Jesus were rebels, abhorrent of rulers and oppressors. A man, by becoming

God, overthrows God, that is, overthrows the father or the ruler. The death of Jesus is a displaced death wish against the father or the ruler. In these *Œdipus* trends, Fromm suspects the unconscious warrant for the charge of incest brought against the early Christians by their persecutors. The worshippers of Jesus in a later generation ceased to be revolutionary. To conquer the Roman Empire, they had to grow conciliatory and conformistic. Reproaches hurled at the rulers became transformed into self reproaches, that is, into penance. The doctrine of the Trinity signifies such a harmonization between rulers and subjects. In the Madonna and child, especially in the food that issues from the Madonna's breast, the sign of forgiveness stands forth. Meanwhile Schjelderup (195) resorts to the psychoanalytic concepts of regression, introversion, extroversion, masochism, sadism, exhibitionism, sublimation and *Œdipus* complex in his discussion of ascetic saints both Buddhistic and Christian; while Marbach (115) renders tribute to psychoanalytic usage when, interpreting the legends of the martyred St. Catherine and the frolicsome Feast of St. Catherine observed by the grisettes of Paris, he senses father attachment, narcissism, sex disillusionment, the fostering of ideals, sado-masochistic imaginings and, at the culmination, the phantasy of being a whore or a Madonna. No. 253 also belongs to this group.

Among the biographical studies employing psychoanalytic viewpoints, is Becker's brochure (8) on the Jewish saint, Rabbi Nachman of Bratislaw (1772-1811). Similarly does Grant Duff (51) handle the life of St. Therese whose colorful religious fancies, whose dreams, raptures and neurotic illnesses are seen to manifest an *Œdipus* attachment to the father, with the attendant hostility toward the mother and the accompanying self disparagements, regrets, self punishments and pious hopes.

Coming to contemporary life, we instance Freud's discussion (58, 59) of a letter received by him from an American physician who relates how, in his student days, the sight of a sweet faced old woman on the dissecting table made him anti-religious—resentful that God should have permitted such a fate—and how subsequently, upon hearing a mysterious voice, he resumed his religious attachments. Freud surmises here a fixation on the mother and, in the mysterious voice, the usual penitent submission to the father. In the circumstance that the physician refers to Freud as a "brother" physician, Freud describes family reminiscences. Edith Vorwinckel (236) posits unconscious impulses to account for a certain woman's conversion from Protestantism to Catholicism. She declares that the conversion

and certain subsequent religious phantasies, phrases and rituals expressed morbid reactions to a faithless, delinquent, alcoholic father and to a severely Puritanic mother. In the case of an Orthodox Jew who, forbidden by his religion to extinguish a light on Friday evenings, contrived a clock mechanism which extinguished it automatically, Reik (167) discerns the customary factors of ambivalence, sense of foreboding, and the "outbreak of the repressed within the repressing." In various ancient vows and sacrifices, Reik is struck by their resemblances to modern insurance schemes. The gods, presumed to be shrewd, evasive and equivocal, have to be circumvented. Pfister (158), well known for his allegiance to psychoanalysis, presents some observations on the hysterical manifestations of a certain Madonna cult. From the analysis of a psychotic Buddhist (155), Pfister comes to pronounce Buddhism a flight from life's conflicts.

With the psychoanalysts, we would also have to rank Mueller-Braunschweig (129) notwithstanding his dissent, on certain minor points, from his fellow analysts. This author explains the representation of God as an unconscious *imago* involving, however, more than the Super-Ego and more than infantile trends. His doctrine is that the experience of psychic and of material determination creates a sense of dependence; the world of moral obligation dominates conduct no less than the world of external force. God stands for the unification of these two types of dependence. While Eleanor Johnson (94) displays no especial leaning toward psychoanalysis, she does nevertheless invoke the concept of sublimation and some case presentations illustrating sublimation. More extensively does Maag (113) devote his attention to the pastoral bearings of psychoanalysis. Similarly Jahn (93) proposes the application of psychoanalysis to the confessional and to religious education. Barbour (6) strives to show how certain traditional notions of sin and forgiveness comport with psychoanalysis. Bovet (27) operates under the psychoanalytic viewpoint when he perceives in religion a filial rather than a maternal or conjugal proclivity; similarly Conklin (40) when he points out hymns that "facilitate a return to infancy." Schroeder (205, 206), Darlington (42), and others in their assaults upon religion have recourse to psychoanalytic terminology.

THE NON-PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES

But most of these publications are not psychoanalytic. Many of them deal with religious motives in the ordinary, non-psychoanalytic sense. A variety of such motives is surmised by our Nos. 72, 213 and 241. These writers dwell upon the multiple motivation in

religious response and on the contrast between apparent motives of an engaging type and real motives that are less winsome. As Halliday (72) puts it: "Psychology has a true service to render religion in disturbing the complacency with which most people regard themselves and in showing that we seldom are what we think we are." Conklin (40) maintains that prayer may proceed from a desire motive, a duty motive and an evangelical motive. This writer also speculates on the motives operative in the formation of sects and in the conservation of churches. Puglisi (162), for his part, discriminates a variety of prayer types which he divides not only into rational and irrational but also into eudemonistic, esthetic, noetic and ethical.

Marnecke (119) shows how religion is related to that which Otto calls the *fascinans* and the *tremendum* and how these aspects appear in erotic, ethical and esthetic experiences, in the sense of achievement at work, and in the consciousness of good health. Though eschewing psychoanalytic terminology, he posits a deep subconscious reservoir of joy whence all joys emanate, to the extent that their paths are unclogged. Mystic ecstasy is the intensest revelation of this inner core of joy while the ordinary sense of well being exemplifies its mildest demonstration. This author affirms that these several types of satisfaction variously elicit one another and react upon one another, sometimes merging, sometimes mutually helping and sometimes interfering. Extensive use of McDougall's well known list of sentiments is made by Conklin (40) and by Holmes (82). Conklin (40) glimpses in religion a combination of drives—the drive for power or wholeness, the drive for sex knowledge, the drive for the continuation of comfortable living—these drives and their resistances. In McDougall's language, religious sentiment, as Conklin dissects it, embraces wonder, self subjugation, tender emotion and fear. Holmes, in a similar strain, analyzes the religious sentiment into fear and wonder coalescing into fascination, and supplemented by the feeling of dependence (possibly the same as the inferiority complex) and the feeling of awe. With Gruehn (69), religion seems to involve merely a fusion of thinking, feeling and willing. Back (5), drawing his inferences from St. Therese's sense of the Divine Presence, concludes that this is a synthesis of (a) an immediate psychic experience compounded of mystic thinking, feeling and willing, (b) the inclination to posit a divine cause for these experiences, and (c) an emotion arising from a combination of (a) and (b). The failure to make this discrimination between an experience and the supervening interpretation of the experience is a shortcoming

which has been detected in our No. 211. Middleton (122), employing psychoanalytic terminology only in a slight degree, observes with reference to George Fox, that minority groups—the Socialists, for example, in our times—tend to “vent their will to power by frantic denunciation. This is a compensation, a sublimation of physical resistance.” “Fox,” continues Middleton, “converted bodily attack into the response of denunciation. . . . For such individuals . . . condemnatory speech does seem to prevent, in part, at least, a ‘blowing up’ of the whole personality. . . . Fox was motor minded. . . . Denunciation was needed to save him from psychopathic behavior.” Along cognate lines, Beth (12) apprises us that a frank and sincere character suffers more from world anxiety than a superficial and indifferent one. More incisive in his enumeration of personality types and in correlating them with religious types is Jaensch (91). Harms (74) dwells upon the place of the Ego in religion.

Thouless (220) advances the thesis that ritual is not, as commonly supposed, a consequence of dogma but the reverse. First comes action or ceremonial, resultant from various promptings. The dogma arrives later as an attempt to interpret the practice. The belief in bodily resurrection, for example, is an intellectualized equivalent of the rite of smearing ochre over the corpse, which practice in turn originated in an unwillingness to admit that the death had occurred. Various doctrines—for instance, Gnosticism and Special Creations—are such precipitates of behavior patterns. The doctrine of evolution supersedes that of creation as soon as it is in a position to serve the older modes of action equally well. Behavior is primary, dogmatic intellectualization derivative and secondary. The psychic factors common to ancient religious dances and modern religious processions are extricated by Van der Leeuw (228).

Yet another construction of religion is that of Leys (111) to whom “religion has been the art, often unconscious and unscrutinized of responding” to situations in which response is inordinately difficult and who further holds that “religion is the art of controlling the organic processes when they become disorganized into what we call emotion.” Similar is the view of Mukerjee (128) that religious observance is meant to aid people in adjusting the inner conflict which arises in the critical situations of sex, food getting, birth, etc. “This adjustment,” he urges, “brings about stability in the life of the individual and in the organization of society.” Little different from this is No. 164 in which Raknes describes religion as an organi-

zation of ecstatic experiences without which organization, the whole personality might disintegrate. Coe (38) asserts that "the prestige or reinforcement that worship confers comes about through the process called suggestion . . . in many cases auto-suggestion." Meanwhile Conklin (40) equates sanctification with maturation and cites revivals as examples of the contraction of the field of consciousness. This reminds one of Leys' (112) definition of salvation as the use of ritual and of devotional and psychiatric technique to stabilize personality, and of Halliday's persuasion (72) that while unconscious compulsions are not sin, submitting to them is. Schneider (199) encounters in the Book of Revelation numerous parallels to modern findings in the field of eidetics and schizothymia. The passages he culls from the Apocalypse indicate minutely visual, acoustic, numerical and dissolving imagery of the eidetic order. Holmes (81) does not scruple to invoke the concept of telepathy to account for some phenomena connected with the career of St. Paul.

A proponent of Alfred Adler's *Individualpsychologie* is J. Neumann (135-144) who commends this outlook as one which agrees with the Gospel. The inferiority complex, central to the Adlerian psychology, is the theme of several writers, among them Rieger (173). Rieger assigns religion and the inferiority complex to divergent spheres. The inferiority complex, he claims, is incidental to relations among human beings. Religion stands for an extra-human relationship with God. The religious sense of inferiority before God must not, according to Rieger, be confused with the inferiority feeling as it prevails between man and man. Another disciple of Adler is Kuenkel (103); similarly Winkler (246) who maintains that religion emanates from a sense of inadequacy and bespeaks man's attempt to feel superior to the forces that envelop him. Schjelderup (195) and Marck (116) also utilize the inferiority concept.

On the border line between the psychological and the theological, stand the discussions about the connection between religious experience and the belief in God. Marnecke (119) argues that belief is not indispensable to religion. He does, nevertheless, concede that the believer is susceptible to certain inspirations from which the non-believer is debarred. Salient is the religious emotion; the theological and metaphysical explanations of the emotion are accretions from the social milieu and vary with the milieu. Aptly does the author quote Schleiermacher, "Eine Religion ohne Gott kann besser sein als eine andere mit Gott." Marnecke further reminds us that one can subscribe to a theology and still be devoid of religious sentiment.

Dimock (46) and Okamoto (147) similarly hold that belief in the existence of superhuman powers is not inseparable from religion. In contrast with this Conklin (40) insists that "a religion is inconceivable without some conception of God." The belief in a Deity he regards as that which differentiates religion from art, from philanthropy and from other beneficent undertakings; although he does admit that, as circumstances change, an individual's conceptions of God change. Beth (14) adopting like Marnecke (119) the language of Otto, pronounces faith to be a becoming certain of the noumenous—that converging point of the terrifying and the fascinating. Unique is the mixture of the psychological and the metaphysical in Beth's doctrine of a metabionitic contact with the noumenal. Beth distinguishes sharply between the psychopathological and the religio-pathological. One may be mentally normal and yet, in relation to the noumenal, abnormal. In this sense the irreligious person is abnormal. Again, in an irreligious society, one may, while normal in one's connections with the noumenal be abnormal—that is, atypical, unusual—in one's social surroundings. During the process of transforming the traditional religion into one's own, in other words, during the process of changing from mere social conformity to noumenal adjustment, conflicts may develop which create the impression of abnormality. This transforming process is one which most people terminate prematurely. The struggle to achieve adaptation to the noumenal amid the distractions of the senses and the world can generate pathological conditions or disturbances verging on the pathological. Of the three titles dealing with religious music (182, 239, 242), No. 182 reports how Roemer sought, by subjecting children to the hearing of certain musical selections, to determine from their reactions which experiences were noumenal and which were not. Unlike Lawton (109) in whose opinion psychology should concern itself entirely with the origin and the functions of beliefs, not with their truth, Reinhardt (170) would assign to the psychology of religion the office of verifying the claim that mysticism achieves union with the Deity.

THEORETICAL STUDIES

Children. Titles that have children as their subjects are Nos. 24, 26, 27, 32, 33, 57, 77, 89, 90, 146, 154, 177, 181, 182. Illge (89) furnishes an exquisite study of compositions written by boys of nine upon the theme: "Als ich ein Mal an den lieben Gott dachte." Storms, dangers, regrets, fear of punishment and the beauties of nature were disclosed as the factors impelling the children to pray.

Some of the boys identified statues with the Deity. A preference was manifest for solitary prayer and for inaudible prayer. Vivid conceptions were professed regarding heaven, hell and devils. Where scepticism had arisen, it was traceable not to the occasional inefficacy of the prayers but to sceptical attitudes on the part of the parents. No. 77 correlates children's Biblical knowledge with such traits as the propensity for lying or cheating as well as for loyalty and altruism. No relation of any consequence between Biblical information and the different phases of conduct studied could be found. No. 32 provides an elaborate set of questions for testing children's ideas about God, Jesus, prayer, the Bible, while, employing methods like those proposed, Bose (26) investigated some 2,500 children in the church schools of Southern California "to discover the meanings which children associate with some concepts current in religious thinking . . . such terms as God, church, salvation, service, worship." He listed one hundred of such terms. The child would underline one of five suggested meanings as most nearly correct or as getting the term "most nearly explained." Some common preconceptions were strikingly invalidated. Bose found, for instance, that family worship or church school attendance exerted little or no influence on the formation of religious concepts. There appeared in these matters little evidence of growth after fifteen years of age. Only a slight relationship seemed to obtain between the intelligence of the group and their understanding of religious terms. The teachers who underwent the test rated but slightly higher than the pupils. Fischer (57) scrutinized the religious dreams of 3,000 children between the ages of six and fifteen; 2,200 were Protestant children and 800 Catholic. The God of the dreams proved to be a finite and a variable God. Angels more frequently than God were the subject and God more frequently than Jesus. Fischer attributes this result to the childlikeness of the supposed angels and the consequent ease with which children could identify themselves with angels. Children of the higher social classes and Catholic children displayed a greater penchant for religious dreams than the children of the lower classes and Protestant children. The dreams of the girls emphasized female sex elements such as beauty, attractive clothes and the like. As a rule the dreams stressed outer form and ignored religious content. Fischer accepts the conclusion that religion is not innate but acquired—a fact, he thinks, from which arguments can be deduced both for and against religious education. Bovet (27) tells of children who pray to the moon. This author sustains the proposition that

religion is not something maternal and not something conjugal but something filial. "As the religion of the parent totters and falls in the tumult of the intellectual crises of early childhood, there dawns for the child the religion of the Heavenly Father." Bovet equates with parent worship, king worship and even sun worship as well as the worship of God. The attitude toward the Pope or the church is likewise something filial, just as patriotism is the parentization of one's country. Bovet concludes that "the thought of the child and its representations are in violent contrast with those of the adult, but in religion as it is lived and experienced by the child and the adult, I am able to see nothing that separates the one from the other. Between those puerile images we lately considered and the loftiest conceptions of our most abstract philosophy is there more than a difference of degree? . . . Children are better prepared than ourselves for profound religious experiences."

Students. Nos. 50, 66, 86, 87, 134, 154, 211, 214 take college students as their subjects. Howells (86) studied the religious convictions of students and the correlation of these convictions with certain physical, intellectual and emotional traits; while Sinclair (211) investigated the relation of similar traits to the sense of the Divine Presence professed by some students and denied by others. Those who did not accept the tenets of religious conservatism and those who did not report having experienced the Divine Presence were found to excel the other groups in the ability to endure intensity of electric shocks and in mental alertness. The conservatives and the mystics were the more responsive to suggestion and the more disposed to acquire skill in order to avoid pain. The two groups being essentially alike in academic grades, the author considers it likely that the religious mysticism may have served in a way to make good the handicaps of intellect and endurance. It was further noticed that those who had been reared by kindly and sympathetic parents were the more prone to develop mystic attitudes than those with stern and censorious parents. In the experience of Divine immediacy, sex also proved to be a factor, women reporting the experience to a greater extent than the men. Correspondingly Howells (87) states in another pamphlet that among the students he questioned, the religious radicals were more intelligent than the religious conservatives and less suggestible, and that the conservatives improved under threat of punishment, while the radicals did not. Griffin (66) watched the effect of college life itself upon the religious feelings and beliefs of students; while C. L. Stone (reported by Starbuck, 214) noted cor-

responding changes in Dartmouth Freshmen. Nathan (134) investigated the attitudes of Jewish students toward Jewish doctrines and usages. He found that two-thirds of his subjects had broken away from a belief in what he calls a "personal" God, and from ritual practices, synagogue attendance, Bible reading, praying and belief in established moral standards. This author divulges that the Jewish Sunday School tends to breed scepticism. One of the consequences of this is that the Jewish women students who are more extensively the product of the Sunday School than the men incline more toward atheism than the men—unlike the women mystics in No. 211. Among those with whom the practice of prayer was on the increase, the larger percentage was that of the men. Intellectual difficulties, especially such as center around science and religion, were apparently aggravated by religious instruction and by religious home life; the longer the period of instruction, the more acute the difficulties. The students who were most creative in their religious thinking were those who had been without religious instruction. On the other hand, Dudycha (50), probing the beliefs of the Freshmen at Ripon College, announces strong affirmative tendencies. "They firmly believe in the Ten Commandments, the existence of God, the divinity of Jesus Christ but are inclined to disagree concerning the existence of the devil and the angels. Taking the group as a whole, there is not a single proposition which is disbelieved more than it is believed." Pauls (154) tabulated the impressions made upon students of pedagogy by two school prayers which were read to them as samples. The students, while hesitating to commend those particular prayers, did favor the practice of devotions in the school room.

Other Youth. Young people other than college students were the subjects for studies numbered 52, 56, 83, 97, 106, 146, 178, 185, 190, 217, 218, 237, 239, 250. Ruth Strang (217) studied 140 High School girls with reference to church connections, Sunday School attendance, religious observances in the home and the like, correlating these with factors of intelligence and of environment; while Kupky (106) analyzed themes submitted by the girls of the six classes of the higher vocational schools for girls at Leipzig on the topic, "What arouses my reverence?" These themes illustrated the familiar anthropomorphic proclivities of childhood and the critical predilections of later adolescence. The rhythm noted between an affirmative and a negative state diverged from that reported years ago by Starbuck. Watson (239) prevailed upon 100 boys to attend and to rate seven different kinds of religious service either as "one of the four or five

highest experiences of your life," "worshipful in the deepest and best sense throughout," "genuinely worshipful part of the time," "a fairly good service," or "very poor." One was a musical service, one dealt with social deficiencies and one with theological questions. The ratings were correlated with age-group, size of town of origin, and denominational affiliation. The author found that "their response is greatest to services that are most clearly emotional" and that "there appears to be no significant difference in age levels from fifteen to eighteen which must be observed by one composing such services." We also learn "that denominational background may be disregarded. . . . Most difference of opinion is likely to be aroused by introduction into such a service of unpleasant facts about our present social order." The musical service, all things considered, received the highest rating and the one dealing with theological questions the lowest. Lantsch (108) accumulated a number of depositions of pupils of college age answering the question, "Ist Religion lebensgestaltend?" Kelloway (97) summarizes the results of various tests aiming to determine the attitude of young people toward worship and the rôle here of environmental factors. Eichele (52) debates the question whether youth is really irreligious. His conclusion is that, behind the indifference of youth, a genuine religiosity can be masked. Childhood and youth are compared in Nos. 105 and 146, the former dealing chiefly with the religious developments marking the transition from childhood to adolescence.

Adults. Markowitz (118) inquired into the prayer life of 44 men and 28 women—Jewish persons, representative and influential members of his congregation, relating these practices to the subject's prior religious education; while Clark (34) records the experience of religious awakening in the lives of 754 males and 1,420 females, and correlates this with sex, country or town origin, ministerial family background, kind of theology and the like. It developed that conviction of sin is dependent upon the subject's theological views, that persons coming from homes in which religion is prevalent are more likely to be religious than those who do not; and that temperament has a determining effect upon the type of religious experience undergone. Clark also noticed that, comparing his figures with Starbuck's of a generation earlier, there had been, as a result perhaps of changed conditions, a lowering of the typical age of awakening from Starbuck's fifteen or sixteen years to twelve years. Clark further observed that the country home is what he terms a "better" religious

agency than the country church. Contrasted with this, conversion cases collated by Schlink (197)—33 of them Protestant and 3 Catholic—exhibit an incidence of conversion much later in life than the cases assembled by Starbuck, James, and Coe. Schlink's cases are not, like those in the American studies, consequences of mass psychology. His conversions take place in isolation and detachment. Will and reason also play in his cases more of a rôle than in the American cases. Willoughby (244) submitted a variety of statements to eight men and four women of high intellectual ability and tabulated the reactions. Interesting is his conclusion: "To such persons the order of phenomena commonly thought of as religious . . . appear as simply evidence of infantilism and profound psychic arrest of development." Starbuck (214), assisted by Mrs. Ivy Husband, computed the effects respectively of space forms and time forms of mentality on philosophical and religious beliefs and attitudes. There was manifest a high positive correlation between "space-time visual mindedness and the ability to comprehend a unitary concept of reality." Steiger (216) observed the religious habits of free thinkers, workers and peasants as well as of students. Meanwhile, Vorwahl (235) is pressed by his statistics to the conclusion that, so far as the prevention of crime is concerned, penances and confessions have proved of doubtful value—a conclusion which is almost identical with Miner's (123) regarding church activities in general. Other titles concerned with law breakers and prisoners are 18, 29, 54, with working people 243, and with the proletarian masses 160.

At least one of the writings on our list (114) derives its results from the observation not of human beings but of baboons and monkeys noticed gazing and barking at the rising and the setting sun. Of such conditioned reflexes, human mysticism seems to the author a vestige. "These," he declares, "do not mark Yahweh's chosen as beings of a rare spiritual order but, at best, indicate them as biological curiosities."

Statistics. Statistical procedures are illustrated by 9, 26, 32, 33, 34, 50, 66, 77, 86, 97, 118, 123, 134, 211, 214, 217, 235, 239, 244, 250. Differing from statistical researches which visage a few aspects of numerous persons are the case studies which scrutinize a few individuals intensively. Having already adverted to most of these, we content ourselves here with setting down the title numbers: 15, 19, 48, 58, 59, 61, 89, 94, 108, 121, 143, 144, 151, 155, 167, 175, 193,

196, 197, 236, 241, 244. The writings that can be classed neither as statistical nor as case studies embody conclusions based upon introspection, general observation, reading and, above all, guesses.

Questionnaires. Questionnaires were the expedient in Nos. 9, 24, 26, 33, 44, 47, 50, 66, 77, 86, 87, 97, 118, 134, 211, 214, 239, 244. No. 181, in determining the nature of children's ideas of God, also had recourse to questionnaires. Written effusions or depositions of their subjects supplied the data for 89, 90, 108, 154, 177. A fascinating example of this type is Vorwahl's (234) article on prayer parodies which, the author thinks, reveals a state of mind that invites examination.

Biographical. We now take up those writings which do not deal with contemporary matters but which are biographical, Biblical or otherwise historical. Our list contains no fewer than three studies of St. Augustine (153, 191, 219) and three of St. Therese (5, 51, 212). Middleton (122) provides a study of George Fox, Marianne Beth (21) a study of Elizabeth of Thuringen, Bohlin (23) of Luther, Huonder (88) of Ignatius of Loyola, and Rudolph (188) of Eckehart. A Hebrew brochure by Jacob E. Becker (8) psychoanalyzes the Jewish mystic, Rabbi Nachman of Bratislaw (1772-1811). The Holmes volume (81) on St. Paul may be classed as either Biblical or biographical. Much of this literature exhibits an apologetic strain. However, there are exceptions. Thus, apparently free of apologetic intent, is Thimme's (219) defense of Augustine against the suspicion of homosexuality and of psychic repression; or his contention that, in Augustine, sex played no part beyond what is usual in esthetics and religion. Thimme does concede that Augustine betrays some conflicts but these are conflicts inherent in religion as such, conflicts due to the disparateness of Augustine's maternal and paternal heritage, conflicts bred by the diversities of Augustine's own experiences and especially conflicts provoked by the Platonism and the Christianity both of which had a powerful grip on Augustine. Reminding us of analogous findings by Clark (34) and by Schlink (197), Thimme perceives in his subject deviations from Starbuck's formula relating to the peaks and the depths of religious interest. Thimme's explanation is that Augustine was not like any of Starbuck's subjects a nineteenth century American placed in an Evangelical Protestant milieu. How Duff (51) regards St. Therese, we have already intimated.

Biblical. Biblical topics appear in 60, 78, 107, 133, 150, 168, 199, 241. The work of Hines (78) on prophecy is largely a discussion

of views advocated by Povah, Joyce and others and an appeal for contemplating Biblical prophecy in the light of more recent mystical occurrences. The Passover is interpreted by Goetz (62) as a glorification of the conflict between the individual and the group. Nass (133) illustrates his "superpositions" (that is, certain introspective tendencies displayed by religious subjects) by citations from Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, and Paul.

Historical. Nos. 115 and 195 contain historical as well as biographical matter, the former recounting various ascetic movements and the latter the traditions of St. Catherine. To these may be added, for their historical import, 36, 60, 110, and perhaps Riddle's volume (172). One point brought out by Riddle relates to the association of masochism with martyrdom. The author suggests that masochism existed less in the martyrs than in those who wrote about and read about the martyrs. Otherwise the book searches out the several elements of social pressure causing the martyrs to meet governmental duress with resistance.

Surveys. With literature of the survey type we may place, besides No. 254, the article by Boeschstein (25) who reviews and discusses a series of writers including James, Pratt and De Buy; Schlink (196) who summarizes both American and European literature on the subject of conversion; Uren (227) who critically reviews Starbuck, Coe, James, Pratt, Stratton and Leuba; Dimock (46), elaborating on various definitions of religion, scans the deliverances of James, Coe, King, Stratton and Leuba. Starbuck (214) presents reviews of our Nos. 77, 87, 239 and others. Neumann (142) reports on the Psychotherapeutic Congress. Neumann (138) and Nahrhaft (132) report and Harms (73) comments on the First International Congress of Religious Psychology held at Vienna, May, 1931. Nos. 49, 213, 222 are offered as text books on the Psychology of Religion. The bibliographer of the entire output on the Psychology of Religion is Roemer (174).

Methodology. Some of these works devote themselves to questions of methodology. Bower (28, 31) is the author of two methodological studies, the second of which contains a schedule for guidance in religiopsychological inquiries. Provision is made for records of the subjects' backgrounds and habits and for discrimination between different types of religious conduct. Something is said about the kind of mentality indispensable for the investigator and about the necessary cautions. Both of Chave's articles (32, 33) are methodological. In No. 33, he constructs a list of 45 statements, assent to

which the subject expresses by checking. No. 32 lays out a program of inquiry into children's ideas about God, Jesus, prayer, the Bible, etc. Appended to 32 is a catalogue of existing tests and measuring devices. A discussion of such procedures as observation, conversation and questionnaires introduces the set of conversion testimonials collected by Schlink (1917). Murphy (131) believes that insight into the psychology of religion has been obtained and that more can be obtained by the study of child psychology and of abnormal psychology. Experimental ventures along these lines may, in his opinion, prove experimental also for the subject of mysticism. In like vein, Hines (78) expects, through an understanding of mysticism, an enhanced understanding of the prophets. Uren (227) in his introductory chapter, exposes the defects of the various methods—the questionnaire method, the biographical method, the historical method, the comparative, the genetic and the experimental methods. The experimental method is actually applied in 133, 200 and 239. Beth (13) objects to atomism in religious psychology. Religious psychology must consider wholes; questionnaires disclose merely cross sections; they require longitudinal supplementation. On the other hand, the purpose of Lantsch (108) seems to have been that of demonstrating the feasibility of questionnaires. To the methodological group also belong 68, 95, 139, 176, 214, 223. Finally Watson (239) points out the precariousness of taking at their face value the casual and unreflective comments of people regarding services of worship.

Criticisms. Yet another one of the classes into which this literature divides is that of critical strictures on other literature dealing with the Psychology of Religion. Some of the criticisms are general like that of Conklin (40). "Much of what one has to read in this field, as in many others, is quite worthless," says Conklin. "Many titles represent presentations which include some valuable material buried in much confusing complication with devotional appeals and theological considerations." Similar is the criticism of Uren (227): "This youthful science . . . its ontological deliverances are as worthless as they are impertinent." A shaft aimed in a different direction is that of Bastide (7) impatient at the frequency with which, under the guise of a psychological approach, religion is assailed. "*Le style pseudo-scientifique cachait si mal une passion anti-religieuse que la réaction se déclara foudroyant contre ces thèses.*" Starbuck (214) comments on the shortcomings of American

investigators. "The 'average' American scholar," he observes, "while keen on scientific technique, has the philosophical skill of a three year old child attempting to wield a giant's bludgeon." Horton's survey (84) is critical both of men and of methods.

The chief butt of opposition, however, is Freudianism. Theological bias may prompt the anti-Freudian pronouncements of Holmes (81), Bolley (24) and Saalfeld (189), yet this can hardly be imputed to Clemen. Clemen accuses Freud and his followers of egregious blunders both anthropological and dialectic. Clinical observations, according to Clemen, refute the Freudian suppositions about the *Œdipus* complex and expose the rashness of applying these suppositions to anthropology. Clemen brands Freud and his followers as anthropological amateurs. He (35) criticizes Allwohn, Reik, Fromm, Fromm-Reichmann, and Abraham for their Freudian handling of Jewish rites and beliefs. This writer (36) further challenges Freud's totem hypothesis and the practice of drawing from neurotic conditions inferences regarding normal people. To Clemen it is not at all surprising that reputable anthropologists should totally ignore Freud. Turner (224) also dilates on Freud's biological and anthropological flaws. Like Clemen, he denounces the *Œdipus* theory as utterly inconsonant with facts. Especially provocative of dissent is Freud's famous tirade against religion, "The Future of an Illusion." In 156, Pfister, Freud's own follower and admirer, raises vigorous issue. Especially trenchant are Mozley's criticisms (126). Mozley suspects behind Freud's slips in questions of religion a subtle, unavowed hankering after religion. Moxon (127), similarly applying psychoanalysis to the founder of psychoanalysis, charges that Freud denies religion by way of denying his own will conflicts. Beth's (16) impression is that Freud "analyzes one knows not exactly what; at any rate it is not religion." Though a devoted follower of Freud and, like Freud, a detester of religion, Reik (166) differs from Freud in that he declines to share Freud's optimism about the impending extinction of religion. The inveterate human hankering after illusion is the bar to that happy consummation. Were the illusions of religion dissipated, other illusions would take their place. Stupidity confers a bliss that men are loth to forego. Even cultivated people who affect an antipathy toward religion are unconsciously intrigued by religion. Meanwhile, Ehrich Fromm (60), though a brother analyst, controverts Reik's view that dogma is a matter of compulsion neurosis. Apparently forgetting the psycho-

analytic doctrine of multiple determination, Fromm prefers to elucidate dogma in terms of class conflict; social rather than individual urges are responsible for dogma.

PRACTICAL STUDIES

Psychiatrists. First we must notice that some of our practical literature addresses itself not to the religious worker but to the psychiatrist. Such is the character of a book like that of Schneider (204) which discusses visions, consciousness of missions, revelations and the like, in so far as they bear upon mental abnormalities, particularly cyclothymia and schizophrenia. Of similar import is 101 in which Kronfeld delineates how psychotherapy has taken over from religion such processes as confession, conversion and transformation. Kronfeld enumerates the differences between psychiatrist and clergyman as to status and as to methods. He also specifies the points of agreement and of divergence between psychiatric and religious modes of approach. To this class also belongs Mayer's lecture on religious maldevelopments in Bergmann's (11) collection of addresses to the Catholic Association, as well as 3, 71, 105, 142, 183. Allers (3), somewhat in line with Reik (169), urges that "to understand a neurosis one must know its metaphysical background." Kuenkel (105) distinguishes on the one hand between a "false" religion whose notions of forgiveness, hope, hereafter serve neurotic ends and, on the other hand, "true" religion which, by revealing the scant importance of the individual and the vast importance of the race, exerts a stabilizing influence. Haeberlin (71) proposes that psychotherapy assume the function of creating certain beneficent individual symbols to take the place of those religious symbols which were once psychically helpful but which, in this age so poor in symbols, have been discarded. Religion as a cause or as a symptom of psychosis obtains consideration in 11, 158, 193, 204, 225.

Education. Prominent is the position accorded the subject of religious education. One of the writers (227) remarks: "The most firmly established results of the psychology of religion are pedagogical." Thus Jahn (92) infers, from the juvenile hunger for stimuli and the youthful power to store up impressions, the advisability of early religious inculcation. Singular attention is bestowed upon the emotional aspects of religious education. Leys (111) counsels that religious education concern itself "with the solution of emotionalized conflicts in the every day experience of the child." Clark (34) cautions against the elimination of emotion in religious education as

well as against the tendency, in some quarters, to stress method to the neglect of content. Also Conklin (4) deplores the fading of religious sentiment from the religious school. Skinner and West (213), on the other hand, warn against the perils of undue emotion and phantasy, while Bolley (24) apprehends that some forms of emotion can prove a hindrance to prayer. Pedagogical suggestions are contained also in 27, 52, 186, 237. According to one of the Iowa University Studies (9), a committee of expert judges sitting in appraisal of juvenile literature granted to non-Biblical material a ranking higher than that of the Biblical in point of literacy quality and of suitability for respective school grades and for the presenting of ethical situations. No fewer than four of our titles deal with the subject of confirmation (47, 98, 165, 186). Other educational inquiries are 83, 92 and 154.

Pastoral. Still another variety of publication is that addressed to the clergyman interested in psychology as a means of enriching his pastoral ministrations. Nos. 2, 30, 44, 70, 72, 80, 84, 93, 94, 101, 113, 116, 117, 132, 142, 151, 157, 159, 193, 194, 203, 241 belong to this class. Here Pfister (159) considers how psychoanalysis can aid in producing that state of mind known as purification and the conquest of sin. The volume by the Dexters (44) is the product of a questionnaire inquiry addressed to the Unitarian clergy with reference to their services in furthering the solution of marriage and sex problems. Allers (2) abounds in practical counsel for the Catholic clergy as well as in the psychological illumination of Catholic doctrines; while Jahn (93) ponders the bearing of psychoanalysis upon the confessional and upon religious education. Neumann's report (142) on the Psychotherapeutic Congress dwells extensively upon the reciprocal assistance that religion and psychotherapy can render one another. The practical advantage of psychological training for the clergyman seems to have been the keynote of the International Congress of Religious Psychology (73, 101, 132). A book with such chapters as "Human Sin and Misery, Their Cause and Their Cure," "Human Ills and Perversities, Their Causes and Their Cures," "The Christian Way of Self Discipline" and the like is called for by Horton (84). Outstanding among the attempts along these lines is Oliver's course of lectures (151). Oliver reminds the reader of the fears commonly suffered in the presence of an examining physician and the contrast with one's feeling of assurance in the presence of a pastor; hence the unique opportunities of the pastor. The book expands upon problems of marriage and sex, and discourses

at length upon the terrors due to false notions about physical and mental health and upon the wisdom of equipping the clergyman with the ability to dispel such notions. Oliver underscores the need of an objective, non-censorious attitude on the part of the religious counsellor—a point of advice also proffered in our Nos. 72 and 94. Halliday (72) warns that an unthinking, angry condemnation “often hits upon a repression and drives it deeper in.” Akin to this is Schairer’s (192) admonition that the clergyman avoid arguing with abnormal individuals and seek rather to control the subliminal determinants. Eleanor Johnson (94) describes a course of psychological training conducted at the Hartford Theological Seminary. Like the Dexters (44) and various other authors, she elaborates upon the need of diagnosing the social backgrounds of unadjusted persons and the importance of grasping the psychic factors behind such evils as alcoholism, infidelity and the like. Holman (80) also would have the pastor understand psychiatry and case work, utilizing religion to help men acquire a sense of security and poise—a possibility to which Cameron (30) likewise refers. Holman (80) cautions that old theological preconceptions can hinder a minister’s efficiency for assisting unadjusted souls. Finally when Halliday (72) conjectures that “this strong feeling of antagonism which criticism arouses in many of us may be due to the fact that we are dimly aware of demands which our philosophy does not recognize and of experiences which it does not explain,” he contributes to the clergyman’s own mental hygiene. Particularly shrewd are Halliday’s remarks about the psychology of the minister’s reactions to comments on his sermons. Meanwhile Marck (117) dwells upon the psychological inadequacies of Hindu and Mohammedan social organization and the suitability of Christianity as a religion for India.

Faith Healing. At this point, mention can best be made of the literature on faith healing. McComb (120), the veteran of the Emmanuel Movement, reports on religio-therapeutic enterprises, societies and institutions such as the *Lebenswende* near Ihlfeld, Germany, such as that of Lourdes, France, and the Guild of St. Raphael and the Divine Healing Fellowship of England. McComb criticizes some of these for ignoring the resources of medical science and for their facile resort to explanations predicated on the occult and the miraculous. McComb grants that in some cases the mental expedients have proved physically beneficial. It is the opinion of Grote (67) that, despite the therapeutic incompetence of most clergymen, ritual may at times improve the condition of the sick. With this view,

Schweitzer (208) takes issue on the grounds that religion should not be employed for worldly purposes. An appendix on "spiritual" healing concludes the volume by Yellowlees (249). Nos. 105, 152, 157, 183, 194, 207, 230, 232 are also religio-therapeutic, while special reference to the clergy as religio-therapeutic practitioners appears in Nos. 104, 135, 194, 207. Psychotherapeutic proposals emanating from the Adlerian *Individualpsychologie* fill the pages of Kuenkel (103) and of Neumann (135, 137, 140, 141). The anti-religious standpoint here is articulated by Reik (169) who reasons that, inasmuch as religion is the source of pathogenic repressions, a fundamental therapeutic step would be the abolition of religion. Reik, somewhat like Allers(3) maintains that, as religious backgrounds differ, the resultant neuroses differ. Reik advocates the extermination of religion as a measure of "collective therapy."

Church Services. Our writers also abound in recommendations regarding church services and functions. Roemer (180) would invoke psychology in order to discriminate between types of church services and to gauge their suitability to respective types of persons, particularly among modern city dwellers, Roemer resembling in this discrimination of types the authors of 31, 216 and 230. Leys (112) who wishes religion to be "ethically defensible, logically valid, economically stable, esthetically appealing, metaphysically sound," would have churches introduce people to "new societies, untouched natural resources, unexhausted esthetic forms and unheeded leaders." The minutiae of worship technique, of church advertisement, and of the part played by factors such as expectation constitute the theme of Conklin (40). Dissenting from Coe who complained about a scarcity of hymns of action, Conklin rejoins that hymns of action belong not at Sunday worship but at week day service clubs. Conklin further pleads: "Just because an experience is enjoyed is no reason for assuming that it brings consolation, orientation and adjustment. The latter is a function of religious experience. . . . A church may entertain more easily than it can produce a religious experience but if it prefers to entertain, it must expect its religiously unsatisfied attendants to be readily attracted elsewhere. . . . Friendship, fellowship, community loyalty, patriotism, international feelings and the like, excellent as they are, cannot, no matter how institutionalized, do for mankind what religion does." In his own way, Coe (38) likewise differentiates between a wrong kind of worship and a right kind. It is Coe's complaint that "public devotions as conducted at present serve only to increase that which is ordinary. Much that

goes on at public services plays into the hands of conservative or reactionary interests." Coe yearns to see the influence of suggestion restricted and real thinking promoted. With him worship requires "over and above the comfort or even inspiration that familiar ideas bring, such stirring up of personality as comes only from the recognition of hitherto unrecognized facts." His thought is not far from that of Halliday (72) with reference to an illusion dispelling function of religion. Kelloway (97) contributes directions for young people's services. "For young people . . . worship should neither be forced into unnatural channels nor inflicted from without. They must be helped to interpret their common experience in terms of worship." Nathan (134), on his part, discusses the rejuvenation of the synagogue and the prospects of adapting it to the educational needs of modern youth.

Prayer. Adhering to the principle of autosuggestion Weatherhead (241) prescribes certain modes of prayer for their superior psychological effectiveness. One is not to beseech forgiveness but to accept forgiveness, not to say "God give me peace," but to say "God is giving me peace." Vorwahl's article (231) on ceremonial postures and gestures, although predominantly anthropological, does not overlook the pedagogical value of gestures. The book by Waterhouse (238) comprises a series of radio talks presenting in popular language the psychological findings on such subjects as conversion, dreams, crowds, psychotherapy, conflict, social pressure. No. 40 with its chapter on retreats as well as 82 and 251 are also compendia of practical hints. With Reik (166) finally, the problem is how to create atheism. To achieve this, there is requisite the psychoanalytic procedure which will ferret out of men those unconscious addictions in which the idea of God lies embedded.

THE NON-SCIENTIFIC

Before terminating this review, we should note the extent to which this literature departs from scientific canons. Few of our writers limit themselves to describing, prescribing and interpreting. Those extra-scientific penchants, evaluation and appraisal, obtrude constantly. The reader can not but be impressed by the inveterate personal bias either for or against that which the particular writer calls religion. The undisguised hostility toward religion on the part of 58, 59, 114, 166, 169, 244 has engaged our attention. With Freud, "neurotic" is not merely a psychiatric term; when used in connection with religion, it becomes a denunciatory term. Freud ridicules

the religious inclinations of the physician whose letter he discusses and takes occasion to jeer at the physician's exhortation—ill advised no doubt—that Freud himself embrace religion. With Reik (169) religion is a symptom of human silliness and the etiology of psychic ills. Malan (114) identifies religion, or at least mysticism, with the gazing of monkeys and the barking of baboons. Willoughby (244) contrives to prove that religion is infantilism and arrested psychic development. The two articles by Schroeder (205, 206) are of parallel drift. Resorting to an anonymous book by an anonymous mediocre clergyman, Schroeder reads into the tangled balderdash the evidence that religion is ungratified sex desire, with the obvious implication, of course, that ungratified sex desire is something reprehensible. That feeling of inadequacy (205) in which religion is bred signifies unsolved sex problems, while religion itself is a perverted way of getting the thrills properly available in love making. Necessarily Schroeder (206) concludes, "When the morbid self accusation has been outgrown, no redeemer is needed or desired." Darlington (42) also, not content with discovering or surmising the sex symbolism of various rituals, proceeds to assert: "On that account, all ritual, no matter how sacred and pure it may be thought to be by its devotees, is not wholly so, but is a disguised sexual drama"—once more the assumption that, while sex is entirely natural and normal, it must be disreputable the moment it gets close to religion. Leys (111) imputes a cultural lag to religion, while Kronfeld (101), though granting a certain indebtedness on the part of psychiatry to religion, can not avoid censuring religion for its identification with "salvation from the encounters of life or resignation to them." Whatever may be the validity of these conclusions, the language in which they are couched, the spirit in which they are propounded and the methods by which they are attained can hardly be called scientific.

Nor is it otherwise with the opposing group. The rôle of *Defensor Fidei* is surely remote from that of the scientific investigator. Some writers accept psychoanalysis in so far as it comports or seems to comport with their theological predilections but no further. Examples are 6, 65, 99. In 210, the defense of religion consists in discrediting every psychological pronouncement that seems at variance not only with current or traditional theological views but even with current theological verbalizations. Again, "If psychoanalysis can invalidate a prayer, it has succeeded in disproving the whole of religion" (79) may be a true statement but it is hardly

scientific. The statement rests on the unscrutinized assumption that there is no other kind of religion and no other kind of prayer than that which psychoanalysis might invalidate. "Do not the esthetic, moral and religious feelings belong to the noblest and the most delicate?" asks Gruehn (69). Doubtless they do, but does science come to expression in that type of judgment?

The "defense" of religion frequently assumes the form of an effort to dissociate religion from sex, the "defenders" apparently joining the "attackers" in the presupposition that sex is not merely an instinct but also—at least when conjoined with religion—a matter of opprobrium. Conklin (40) may well be within the range of the factual when he declares that "the relationship between sex and religion is far more frequently one of conflict and the means of relief than one of genetic derivation." But this can hardly be predicated of Hodge's (79) attempt to exonerate prayer from all taint of sex composition, or perhaps of Marianne Beth's (21) endeavor to shield Elizabeth of Thuringen against all suspicion of eroticism. Of kindred bent is Hodge's insistence on ruling out suggestion as a religious factor or Marianne Beth's on excluding inferiority feelings.

Various writers on mysticism adopt what fringes on the apologetic in their meticulous distinction between different kinds of mysticism, like Back (5) who, discussing St. Therese, differentiates between mysticism of the genuine kind and spurious mysticism. Schjelderup (195) calls attention to the social benefits as well as the social drawbacks of asceticism. Similar qualms seem to animate the effort of Holmes (81) to prove that Paul was not an epileptic. "That God gave St. Paul his transcendent vision seems to be the conclusion to which all facts faithfully considered lead us." Beth (14) controverts the charge that religion is a flight from reality, resembling in this Mueller-Braunschweig (129) and Edith Vorwinckel (236). Just as Bastide (7) maintains that religion may be not a neurosis but a successful dealing with a neuroses, Pfister (156) declares that religion is not a neurotic compulsion but a release from such.

Many of our writers are beset with compunctions about the "objectivity" of that which is apprehended by the religious consciousness. Yellowlees (249) feels assured that describability in psychological terms is no evidence against a "Divine Source." Other examples are 24, 72, 81, 210. Holmes (81) goes so far as to supply metaphysical arguments in favor of occultism. Apt is Horton's (84) comment that the conflict between contemporary theology and psy-

chology is not unlike that between theology and astronomy at the time of Galileo or between theology and biology at the time of Darwin.

The widespread admixture of the non-scientific in works supposed to be scientific or in works that otherwise are scientific has made the construction of our list no easy matter. When the term "psychology" will be restricted to the factual, and other terms devised for the apologetic, the polemic and the evaluative, the construction of a real list on the psychology of religion will undoubtedly become more feasible.

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BOOK REVIEWS

KARPF, F. B. *American Social Psychology*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1932. Pp. xvii+461.

This timely volume is an historical guide to the development of American social-psychological thought. The scope of the book is perhaps somewhat minimized by the title. For in presenting the picture of contemporary American social psychology, Dr. Karpf has devoted fully one-half of the book to the *European Background* of American work. The author's method is, as Professor Faris says in the Foreword, a "modified biographical treatment." However, Dr. Karpf has been fully aware of the dangers of such an approach and there is throughout the book an attempt to relate and integrate each topic with the work as a whole.

The book is divided into two parts. Part I is devoted to *The European Background* and begins with the *Nineteenth Century Philosophical Background* provided by Hegel, Comte, and Spencer. This is followed by a survey of the development of social-psychological thought in Germany, France, and England. Part II is a consideration of *The Development of Social-Psychological Thought in the United States*, beginning with the early sociological and psychological influences of Ward and James. Social psychology then makes its appearance as an extension of psychological and sociological theory in the hands of Baldwin and Cooley. Following that, we note the emergence of a differentiated social psychology due to the efforts of Ross, Mead, Dewey, and Thomas. And finally, there are the attempts of Ellwood, Bogardus, F. H. Allport, Bernard, and Young at a systematic treatment of social psychology as an independent discipline.

An historical survey with such a scope as this could easily be uncomfortably pedantic. But Dr. Karpf's complete familiarity with her subject, her ability to delineate the significant, and her sense of historical relationship combine to give a congenial and satisfying picture of the background of modern social psychological thought. Perhaps most noteworthy is her appreciation of the historical significance of the movements and writers with which she is concerned. For example, we find Gumplowicz's work as "an important counterbalancing factor to the individualistic interpretations of the social process" (p. 72); Darwin's theory of emotional expression assumes

social importance because "it implies an original social situation as a genetic and evolutionary background" (p. 156). We see the English anthropologists supplying the "foundation for the development of all modern thought about human conduct and social life" (p. 168). The spectacular theories of Tarde, Durkheim, and LeBon are shown to have forced a needed hearing for social psychology during its early development. The instinct psychology and genetic studies gain new significance when they are viewed as counterbalances of the one-sided study of social life.

In her treatment of the beginnings of the social psychological movement in America, Dr. Karpf points out the intimate relation of American and British thought which early forced American thought into English channels. Too, we see the revolt of American social psychological thought from traditional individualism and *laissez-faire* due to the social and political turmoil following the Civil War and its crystallization in the sociology of Ward who combined in America the evolutionary point of view with the positivism of Comte.

As we view this panorama of development outlined by the author, the sweeping generalizations of earlier writers are found to contrast sharply with the comparatively sterile gropings of later contributors. We find social psychology emerging as a field of study only after much indispensable preliminary floundering. So many of the contributions reviewed now seem to be matters of such common acceptance—*viz.*, Cooley's interactionism and Dewey's insistence that habits are acquired—that their formulation appears unnecessarily laborious. Yet all these doctrines are seen as inevitable means of orientation during the formative years of the science and "whatever absolute scientific value may be attached to the accomplishments of social psychology so far, from the standpoint of further progress in the field, they alone stand between the undefined and undirected feeling of dissatisfaction with individualistic psychological and social theory a few decades ago and the present more or less secure and many-sided attack upon the problems of social psychology" (p. 424).

It is with a definite feeling of relief that we find modern American social psychology becoming mature enough to undertake specific problems and to accumulate facts without any longer being obliged to apologize for its methods. After we have reached this stage in the survey, we would perhaps welcome more illustrations of modern investigation than Dr. Karpf has included, although a supplementary monograph on *Current Developments in American Social Psychology* is projected by Dr. Karpf.

This sketch of the volume's contents has in no way done justice to the thoroughness of Dr. Karpf's treatment. The book contains ample quotations from the sources, besides providing elaborate references for more advanced readers. The bibliography is as complete and international as one would desire. As Professor Faris states "Nowhere is there available any comparable survey of the contributions of modern scholarship in this field" (p. xvii).

HADLEY CANTRIL.

Harvard University.

HUNTER, EARLE L. *A Sociological Analysis of Certain Types of Patriotism*. New York: Paul Maisel Co., 1932. Pp. 263.

With a certain gusto and pomposity, the author proposes to "resolve the confusion as to the meaning and the nature of certain types of patriotism." He has selected as his material "news items, editorials and letters to the editors" from some fifty-one newspapers scattered throughout the country. He has observed how these papers reacted to four specific events: "(1) the naval proposals made in 1927-1928 to the Coolidge administration; (2) the controversy of 1928 over the alleged blacklist of the Daughters of the American Revolution; (3) the Federal Trade Commission's 1928 investigation of the propaganda activities of utilities companies; and (4) the controversy over the religious issue in the presidential election of 1928." "The statements of attitudinal behavior secured from the analysis of newspaper material were classified and reclassified to the point where there merged clear central tendencies in the various portions of the data." The "types" that emerged were the following: *State Supremacy*, *Institutional Loyalty*, *National Egocentrism*, *Eclectic Institutional Loyalty*, *Critical-Mindedness Toward the State*, and *National Self-Sufficiency*. Each one of these logical categories is illustrated with a score of pithy quotations; its "social significance" is suggested; and the attempt is made to see whether its implications are "borne out by the facts of social life." The author claims that the assumption formerly made that patriotism is a broadly functioning loyalty to the totality of country is not demonstrated by his study, rather that "Loyalties were shown on analysis to be loyalties to specific ends, and patriotic loyalties, so-called, were shown to be but loyalties to specific aspects of country." Due to this confusion which results from different meanings attached to patriotism, Mr. Hunter proposes a less ambiguous word, "communalism," which implies "the use of the general welfare of community for criticizing and for rationalizing ever and anew the many specific loyalties of social life

that they may function in accordance with interests of the welfare of the broadest community involved in their operation."

This book will probably prove unsatisfactory both to the psychologist and the sociologist. It will be evident to the former that the method is far too superorganic, as the author admits (*vide* pp. 30, ff.), to be useful either as a typology in the study of personality or as an explanation for the genesis of this aspect of social behavior. Sociologically, aside from a few questionable criteria, Mr. Hunter has been too timid. He has drawn his types out of the ruffled air of newspaper quotations and has failed to indicate, except very informally in the case of *National Self-Sufficiency*, why and which newspapers or people have these various patriotic attitudes. It is as though he had shown the reader a picture of six masked and costumed figures and had forgotten to relate who these people are and why they have selected their peculiar disguises. His excuse for these important omissions is made evident when he exclaims, in the manner of many Ph.D. theses, that "this is done in such a way that further work could be undertaken. . . ." Only this additional labor can make these six uncompleted sketches at all intelligible.

LEONARD W. DOOB.

Dartmouth College.

HIRSCH, N. D. M. *Genius and Creative Intelligence*. Cambridge: Sci-Art Publishers, 1931. Pp. 339.

Dr. Hirsch paints the figure of Genius upon a large canvas, and bestows rather more pains upon the background than he does upon his central figure. The setting of genius, as the author sees it, requires quite a radical reformulation of current psychological concepts and theories. The result is an original treatment of many problems, among which the relation of instinct to intelligence is perhaps the most outstanding. According to the author there are three dimensions of intelligence, one of which, and here he follows McDougall, is closely bound with the operation of instinct (subjective intelligence), another is the familiar type of intelligence sought in mental tests (objective intelligence), and a third is a happy blend of instinct, objective intelligence, and *rapport* with the racial unconscious (creative intelligence). These three types of intelligence receive extensive treatment, and offer a framework for the author's novel views of language, laughter, and intuition. Language is interestingly related to the process of socialization, and both of these to objective intelligence. Intuition is related to creative intelligence, and is, like genius, of two orders—artistic and scientific. These orders differ in

that the first characteristically anticipates or precedes associative thinking, while the second is dependent upon or follows such thinking.

Perhaps the most original of the many original chapters is that which deals with laughter. After an incisive classification of the types of laughter, and a convenient summary of the standard theories, the author presents his arguments for regarding laughter and language as the chief motor expressions of objective intelligence. His own theory holds that we laugh when we desire to interrupt a train of thought, and when for this purpose we *cannot* use language, or *may not* use language, or find language *insufficient*.

The author recognizes affinities between his view of laughter and McDougall's, and indeed throughout the entire book expresses a certain dependence upon McDougall. He uses the same conception of instinct and of temper, a similar conception of the inheritance of acquired characters, and restates McDougall's prophecy that society must exert a creative adaptation through eugenics or face a return to barbarism. The author's notion of the group mind, however, seems to be much closer to Jung's than to McDougall's. His conception of the relation of intelligence to instinct is undoubtedly more carefully reasoned than that of McDougall.

The book illuminates the psychological setting of genius rather than genius itself. Still the reader does not feel defrauded. He has gained a point of view which is rich, and to a degree quite novel, and which in the long run will undoubtedly contribute its share to the solution of the difficult and many-sided problem of greatness.

GORDON W. ALLPORT.

Harvard University.

LANGE-EICHBAUM, WILHELM. *The Problem of Genius*. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: Macmillan Company, 1932. Pp. xix+182.

This work presents the numerous aspects of genius when genius is considered as a social experience. According to the author, the problem of genius is a religio-psychological problem; a genius is a "bringer of spiritual values who is revered by numerous persons." As such, he may not be investigated in isolation, is not a special psychological type, is never "born" nor "unrecognized." Those whom the public has invested with genius have had differing talents and capabilities, followed various callings, made dissimilar contributions to progress. All have appealed successfully to some *Zeitgeist*, luck playing a part, and all have been *famous* in life or after death. Their fame, a common prerequisite of genius, passed through regular

stages which may be represented graphically. In general, psychopathic or psychotic tendencies have assisted their recognition as geniuses. Genius is neither absolute nor immortal.

The Problem of Genius was rewritten in popular style from a larger work, *Genie, Irrsinn und Ruhm*, 1928, and the pathographies are omitted. Its most detailed part is the chapter on *Genius and Insanity*. The book consists of a series of assertions; there are few arguments, and no particular psychological theory is defended. The psychological statements are descriptive rather than explanatory, but the cataloguing of a great many factors pertinent to the problem of genius should be suggestive and valuable to the psychologist. This investigation of genius is among other things an important contribution to the psychology of religion, being in line with recent trends in that field.

HOWARD DAVIS SPOERL.

Harvard University.

ITARD, JEAN-MARC-GASPARD. *The Wild Boy of Aveyron*. Translated by George and Muriel Humphrey, with an introduction by George Humphrey. New York: Century Company, 1932. Pp. xxiv+104.

The *Wild Boy of Aveyron* is a delightfully written well-translated little book, which will be found entertaining and worth reading by almost any educated person, and which is filled with suggestions for those whose special interests lie in the field of child development and the education of the handicapped. It describes the efforts of Itard to civilize and educate a wild boy who was captured in the woods in which he is believed to have been living as a wild animal without human contacts from the age of four or five to eleven or twelve years. When the boy was brought to Paris in 1800 he was examined by Dr. Pinel, the great authority of the time. At this time the child was inferior to our domestic animals. He was a filthy, apathetic creature who could not fix his eyes or attention for a moment, made a single guttural sound, could not climb onto a chair, would barely turn to the sound of a pistol-shot fired near his ear, although he turned to the sound of a cracking nut; did not sneeze when his nostrils were filled with snuff, would eat disgustingly dirty food with pleasure, and would pick potatoes from boiling water or red-hot coals from the fire and replace them without haste. Pinel was unable to find the slightest evidence of intelligence or sensibility in his actions and diagnosed him as an incurable idiot.

Itard believed that the degradation of the boy was the result of

lack of human society and training and that with appropriate education he could be brought to normal. This Itard proceeded to do through leading his pupil by almost imperceptible steps to nervous sensibility, interest in social life, and to the performance of simple mental operations. These methods were later further developed by Sequin, a pupil of Itard, and still have an important place in the education of the feeble-minded.

Itard's first efforts met with brilliant success. Before the end of the first nine months of training the wild boy had changed from a filthy apathetic man-animal to what Itard describes as an "almost normal child who could not speak." He was clean, affectionate, sensitive to approval and disapproval, and with the exception of hearing all his senses were well developed. As the months passed, however, progress became slower, and he never became a normal human being. At the end of five years, the "wild boy" had not learned to talk and was able to do little that could not have been learned by a child of four or five or younger if he had chanced to fall under the care of a teacher of such resourcefulness, insight, patience, and sympathy as had the teacher of the Wild Boy of Aveyron. However, it still remains a question whether the boy was feeble-minded at birth and perhaps abandoned by his parents for that reason, or whether his retardation was the result of the extraordinary environment to which he had been subjected.

PSYCHE CATTELL.

Harvard University.

DODGE, RAYMOND, and KAHN, EUGEN. *The Craving for Superiority*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931. Pp. vii+69.

The relation of factual inferiority to factual superiority and the relation of feelings of inferiority to feelings of superiority are considered from a point of view which may be described as a synthesis of psychology and psychopathology. The authors make a plea for precise description as a corrective for the hasty and ill-considered generalizations so common in the treatment of such a topic.

The craving for superiority is practically universal in human beings, both normal and abnormal, differing widely in the degree of emphasis and in the media of satisfaction. The sense of superiority, as well as the sense of inferiority, may be based on real or fictitious grounds. Whether or not a person is going to feel superior or inferior depends, in part, on the personal system of values which he has involved for his self-evaluation. He may be unhappy as the second best pugilist while another person is elated to be rated the

third best. Then, too, the individual's standing is dependent upon the society in which he moves. As a pugilist, he may feel superior in a group of fight fans and inferior at a gathering of the intelligentsia.

Centrifugal adjustment occurs when the individual forces the environment to conform to his own desires, eventuating in feelings of superiority. Centripetal adjustment occurs when the individual is constrained to adapt himself to the demands of the environment, eventuating in feelings of inferiority.

Human beings want prestige rather than mere accomplishment because vanity plays such a large rôle in their motivation.

There is no craving for inferiority. "Even the masochist seeks pleasure; and pleasure will always be connected with the sense of superiority. . . . A feeling of superiority may be attained through humiliation and humility. . . . Most men would prefer even pseudosuperiority to inferiority." Each human being is unique and proud of it. The craving for superiority is insatiable, urging the individual to search for more worlds to conquer.

Delusions of grandeur illustrate the fact that the craving for the feeling of superiority may be high while the craving for superiority is low.

Such is the variability of human nature, that even individuals of outstanding superiority are sobered by the realization of their inferiorities. "Undue euphoria often seems to presage a period of depression."

Through the compensatory concept of immortality man succeeds in rising above time.

The book is suggestive rather than exhaustive. Its thoughtfulness commends it for a studious perusal.

WAYLAND F. VAUGHAN.

Boston University.

ACHILLE-DELMAS, F. *Psychologie Pathologique du Suicide*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1932. Pp. xi+237.

Part I is a criticism of the sociological approach to the study of suicide. Part II is a consideration of the psychopathology of the suicide, the author feeling that this viewpoint is necessary to supplement the glaring inadequacies of the sociological treatment of the subject.

The criticism of the sociological point of view is mainly an attack upon the work of Durkheim. Statistics on suicide have been assembled without due regard for scientific controls. Different countries use different methods in keeping their records; the relation of

the number of suicides to the total population is ignored. Statistics on suicide at best are inaccurate, since it is difficult at times to determine the cause of death, and often the examiner is not thorough in his investigation of the case. Further difficulties enter into the interpretation of the statistics. It is no wonder conclusions which are drawn are beset with contradictions. Even with the modern improvement of statistical method, the sociological approach is woefully incomplete.

An understanding of suicide necessitates an investigation of the psychopathology of each individual case. Pseudosuicides occur when a person kills himself by accident, or in a fit of compulsion, or by way of euthanasia. Such instances must be distinguished from true suicide, where the person is sane, kills himself by choice, feeling no moral obligation to refrain from ending his life. The most prominent type of suicide is the cyclothymic. Other types are the melancholic and the hyperemotional. Principal causes of the hyperemotional suicide are abandonment by mate, discovery of infidelity, loss by death, and rarely, financial reverses. Each type is analyzed in detail.

Most suicides can be prevented by therapy administered in the early stages tending toward self-inflicted death, by the medical profession.

Attention is also paid to historic cases of suicide, to the relation of alcoholism to suicide, to suicide pacts, and to the contagious nature of suicide.

The thesis stressed throughout the book is that the psychic nature of the individual is far more important for the understanding of suicide than the environmental factors which are merely the occasions for exaggerating the psychopathological tendencies inherent in the personality.

WAYLAND F. VAUGHAN.

Boston University.

KLAGES, LUDWIG. *The Science of Character*. Translated by W. H. Johnston. Cambridge, Mass.: Sci-Art, 1932. Pp. 305.

American students of personality have given scant attention to the writings of Ludwig Klages which at first sight seem so neologistic and strange, and from the academic point of view, so unpleasantly heterodox. It must be confessed, however, that many of the most original contributions to the study of personality have come through "irregular" channels, and that Klages ranks high among the provocative and influential non-academic writers of Europe. His *Grund-*

lagen der Charakterkunde first appeared in 1910. It was largely rewritten for the fourth edition in 1926. The present translation was made from the fifth and sixth editions.

The fame of Klages is sometimes thought to rest exclusively upon his work with handwriting, but graphology plays a relatively small part in his doctrine of characterology. Neither handwriting nor any other form of expression, he holds, can be understood without continuous reference to the dynamic motive forces in personality. Accordingly, in this volume he supplies a framework for such a system of psychology as he believes the study of characterology to require. The six fundamental categories in his system deal primarily with activity and striving. The list contains *sensation, impulse to motion, act of apprehension, act of will, contemplation, and impulse to formation*. The last two functions, he maintains, have been completely neglected by academic psychology.

The originality of the volume consists chiefly in the use it makes of these six fundamental factors, or components of personality. Other original features are its analysis of the diverse forms of egoism, its examination of the relation of language to the problem of judging personality, and also its insistence upon the view that expression is a goal of life. In all these fields the reader is offered inviting theories and attractive suggestions but scarcely a complete outline of a "science of character."

Klages' psychological point of view is explicitly personalistic. He teaches above all else that the "individual peculiarity of the living entity must be made the basis for interpreting every manifestation of life." All academic psychology, he believes, is poverty stricken, and unable to treat adequately human *individuality* which is the one outstanding fact of both biological and psychological phenomena. The problems of individuality, he holds, are much greater, richer, and more manifold than can be treated with the meager and discordant formulas of the traditional schools of psychology.

To-day Klages' unfavorable opinion of psychology seems unnecessarily harsh and malapropos. Everywhere research seems to converge more and more upon problems of personality. But if his indictment is an anachronism, it is only because psychologists have spontaneously adopted some of the problems which for many years Klages has been calling to their attention, and have even commenced in a tentative way to admit some of his principles into their horizon.

GORDON W. ALLPORT.

Harvard University.

MEAD, MARGARET. *The Changing Culture of an Indian Tribe*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1932. Pp. vii+313.

Like the author's earlier books on Samoa and New Guinea, this volume represents a few months of intensive work in a more or less primitive group, and deals mainly with the adjustment of the individual to society. But this time the subjects are a disorganized Indian tribe who live in the Mississippi Valley, and appear, for very good reasons, under an assumed name.

Contact with the whites has destroyed the social forms which regulated the Indian's life in the old days. "Some of these social forms are completely gone, others are mutilated beyond understanding of their earlier forms, and still others are skewed into new and anomalous uses. Within this disintegrating social structure, the individual develops a formless uncoordinated character." The conflict between old and new is especially severe in the economic values and in the standards of sexual behavior.

The author brings in, as illustrative material, a number of anecdotes, statistics of household organization, marriage histories, sample conversations, case histories of twenty-five delinquent females, and a few figures on language and race mixture.

As a study of sociology on an Indian reservation, this book opens a new field. To the psychologist, however, it offers very little, since the type of personality studies which it contains will hardly satisfy him.

WALTER CLINE.

Harvard University.

MONEY-KYRLE, R. E. *The Development of the Sexual Impulses*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932.

Critics of psychoanalytic procedure not uncommonly meet with the rejoinder that one should avoid discussion until one has had experience in the field. Hence the present reviewer feels incompetent to comment intelligently on the doctrines propounded in the latter part of this suggestive work. That, however, does not preclude one from repeating the well-founded charge frequently leveled against psychoanalysts in general that they tend to transform hypotheses into principles and guesses into postulates. Nor does it prohibit one from the expression of a *tu quoque*, when faced by a volume such as this, which claims to have erected a consistent psychoanalytic structure upon established psychological and physiological findings and principles. Indeed the present charge limits itself to just this criticism: that the author should have studied his psychology thoroughly before

using it as a background for psychoanalytic dialectics. One cannot object to the analytic arguments; within their own universe of discourse the psychoanalysts are probably fully entitled to their own methods and discoveries, many of which are highly suggestive to the more plodding and perhaps shortsighted investigator. One can, however, object to specious half-truths; to that policy which, casting a sop to that pig-headed Cerberus, the radical empiricist, steals by into the Hades of psychoanalytic shadows.

To quote the author: "I have tried to present a conception of psychology which reconciles Behaviorism with Introspection and combines the merits of both." Also: "A few propositions are selected to form the apex of an inverted pyramid and the rest are shown to be logically deducible from these." And again: "If it is not yet possible to deduce psychoanalytic prepositions (*sic!*) from simpler propositions of psychology which everyone would accept, I believe it could nevertheless be shown that they are at least plausible consequences of what is already known or suspected." Comment in a short review is impossible and would be superfluous.

The body of the text confirms one's suspicions. The first two chapters, dealing with the nature of psychology, the impulses of the organism and their phylogenesis, present a clumsy (see, *e.g.*, pp. 25-36) and inaccurate (pp. 63-64) statement of an already antiquated behaviorism, combined with epiphenomenalistic philosophy (p. 17). The author indulges in anthropomorphic interpretations of animal behavior (pp. 68, 75, 78) and in word-magic. (What in objective terms is meant by such phrases as: pain-center; want-center; animate idea; innate olfactory tropism; cross-inheritance?) Glib and often wonderfully laborious explanations (pp. 41, 57-59, 64, 68, 75-77, 80, 90) are offered when obviously simpler explanations would have sufficed. Old logical fallacies (especially those of the *propter hoc* order) are once more unconcernedly paraded in full for the benefit of the credulous.

The remainder of the thesis, dealing with "cultural impulses," the ontogeny of impulses, and the consequences of psychoanalytic theory, is presumably erected upon these shifting sands. The suggestions therein contained arise almost entirely out of psychoanalytic speculation. Most of them have already been expressed elsewhere. They are interesting as speculations; they are suggestive of further avenues of inquiry; but they are not, at least in their present form, acceptable to the objective psychologist. Certainly they bear little if any *logical* relationship to psychological principles.

A year before this volume was published there was placed on the market E. B. Holt's "Animal Drive and the Learning Process." The reviewer recommends that before any further attempt be made to write a book on "the development of the sexual impulses" the would-be author consult and master that astoundingly comprehensive and suggestive work. If dereistic speculation be the objective, then let him close Holt but make no claim to scientific objectivity.

O. L. HARVEY.

Boston University.

MONTMASSON, J. M. *Invention and the Unconscious*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932. Pp. xxiv+338.

The author presents a somewhat dogmatic and not very original conception of invention. The thesis is mostly an elaboration of Poincaré's *Science et methode*, extended into a number of fields and a bit more systematized. After an introduction based on a psychologically naïve epistemology, there is first an exposition of the mental processes in scientific invention, and then the development of invention under the influence of the unconscious.

"To invent is to find something new and ingenious by the power of one's mind . . .," and invention adopts the following course: need or desire; a long conscious preparation; the production of invention by creative imagination in either a sudden flash or imaginative elaboration; a long process of conscious verification. This formula varies but slightly from one science to the other. Sensation, feeling, perception, memory, imagination, judgment and reasoning are all shown in a naïve psychological manner to be largely due to the unconscious, which is the "residue of consciousness when it has reached a minimum of attention."

The second half of the book is concerned with the theory of integral knowledge, "the sum of all psychical activities which combine in the great work of invention," and explanation of the automatic, dynamic and aesthetic forms of the unconscious. The first insufficiently supplies habit activity; the second, "'all the forms of unconscious activity, which, in a given moment and in the normal state, influence our mentality'" (from Dwelschauvers' *L'inconscient*, p. 112); the last, the unconscious feeling or affective element attached to and supplementing the dynamic. "The development and modification of the invention . . . are the joint work of the dynamic unconscious effecting annexations and the aesthetic unconscious unifying results."

The book as a whole contains no startling discovery. The facts

have been known rather explicitly for some time. Although it is a good review of theory apart from modern views, the author labors many points in a highly speculative manner, especially the fact that we cannot crowd into consciousness all our "ideas" and thoughts.

Montmasson's use of the term soul is no more reassuring than his other antiquated psychological theory.

R. N. SEARS.

Harvard University.

SYMONDS, PERCIVAL M. *Diagnosing Personality and Conduct.* New York: Century, 1931. Pp. xvi+602.

If asked to name the most conspicuous development in psychology during the past fifteen years, many psychologists would mention the enormously increased emphasis on personality, particularly on its diagnosis and measurement. So voluminous has this literature become (Symonds selects 944 titles for mention), that it is strange that no comprehensive summary of it has previously appeared, although numerous books contain brief and inadequate chapters on the subject, and personality tests themselves have come to have wide experimental and practical use. So Professor Symonds' excellent survey of this body of material should find a wide welcome.

Not many safe generalizations of consequence can be made about a mass of experimental literature so diversified in content and so uneven in quality as this literature of personality measurement. Criticism, at present, must be chiefly directed upon specific techniques and particular instruments. Hence, after a single introductory chapter on the significance of diagnosis and measurement, Symonds proceeds at once to a review of the methods and their particular applications, discussing: Observation, ratings, questionnaires (in general), adjustment-questionnaires, attitude-questionnaires, interest-questionnaires, tests of conduct, knowledge and judgment, performance tests, free association methods, physiological measures of emotions, interviewing, psychoanalysis, external and bodily signs, measures of the environment, and case studies.

While each chapter is, of course, organized in accordance with its peculiar content, a brief sketch of one chapter taken at random will indicate the general character of the treatment. Chapter V, "Adjustment Questionnaires" (following, be it remembered, the chapter in which general considerations of questionnaire construction and use have been discussed), opens with a description of the Woodworth Psychoneurotic Inventory (given in full), and its several derivatives. A section on reliability follows, citing coefficients obtained in various

investigations, and a similarly designed section on validity. Then follow fairly full descriptions of several other well-known instruments and the experimental findings obtained with them, following the same general order of treatment. The Pressey X-O Tests, Questionnaires to Measure Introversiion-Extroversiion (spelled with an "o"), and Ascendance-Submission are thus reviewed. The 40-page chapter ends with a brief summary section and a bibliography of 80 references, classified under the major types of questionnaire mentioned.

From this it will rightly be inferred that Professor Symonds has endeavored to give a full and faithful account of the work others have done and the facts they have found, and to let his own criticisms and theoretical interpretations take a subordinate place, growing out of the consideration of specific techniques and methods. This method of critical summary of a wide literature makes it a highly useful reference volume, as well as an unusually readable textbook—a combination of merits, incidentally, not so common as we might wish. While not a "popularization," the technical level of presentation is such that intelligent readers, though statistically naïve, can read it with little difficulty and much profit; this fact will make it the more acceptable to workers in many extra-psychological fields, such as social work, school, vocational and personal guidance and counseling, religious and character education, medical, legal and behavior clinics, etc., where the need of such instruments of diagnosis is widely felt. At the same time, the constant emphasis upon the necessity of reputable scientific procedures in determining reliability and validity, devising and standardizing techniques, obtaining norms, and setting critical scores, will tend to discourage amateurish tinkering with these tools, and to put a premium upon sound training in test techniques.

I am sure that many other psychologists will join me in thanking Professor Symonds for this timely and adequate volume.

FORREST A. KINGSBURY.

The University of Chicago.

LURIA, A. R. *The Nature of Human Conflicts*. Translated from the Russian by W. Horsley Gantt with a foreword by Adolf Meyer. New York: Liveright, 1932. Pp. xiii+431.

It seems to me that one of the chief factors blocking real progress in psychological science for the last few years has been the rift between the experimental psychologist and the professional psychiatrist. A few psychiatrists like Bleuler, from whom I quote, have always been of the opinion that "psychiatry without psychology is

like pathology without physiology" and a considerable number of psychologists have not lost view of the important problems of psychiatry. But the general run of both psychiatrists and psychologists have treated each other with little respect and sometimes even with disdain and suspicion. Both have been to blame. The outcome of the usual laboratory experiments, for instance on emotion or nonsense syllables, gave the psychiatrist little of value to work with compared with the tremendously intriguing theories of Freud and the psychoanalysts. The psychiatrists, on the other hand, have been all too prone to accept the viewpoints of their leaders without that experimental criticism which is essential to the healthy growth of any science.

It is encouraging to be able to see many signs of a mending of this breach. In the first place at several institutions, for instance Yale, psychologist, neurologist and psychiatrist have united in the study of abnormal behavior. Secondly, the psychiatrists themselves are adopting a more favorable attitude toward psychological research. A comparison of the symposium held in 1925 by the Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Diseases on Schizophrenia with the symposium held by the same society in 1930 on Manic-Depressive Psychosis is enlightening. Three things I believe are indicative. In 1930 the psychiatrists seem much less engaged in debating in a school boy fashion the functional and organic viewpoints and hence inclined more to accept functional theory as something of value. In 1930 several workers, for instance Curt Richter, who are primarily psychologists were asked to contribute. I think it would be fair to state from the discussions appended to each report in the published account of these sessions that Richter's contribution was one of the most favorably received in the whole symposium. In 1930 there seems too to be a much wider interest in the problems of general psychology than in 1925. Thirdly, in the last few years there have been suggestions toward an experimental psychopathology. One thinks at once of the proposals of Hamilton, Pavlov, and Lewin. In the book under consideration these suggestions seem to be bearing fruit. In Luria's work we have the beginnings of an experimental psychopathology. Its significance is therefore scarcely to be overestimated. Furthermore, its appearance in English is most timely, because although some of us knew of Luria's work through personal contact or from perusal of his few articles in English and German, the detailed acquaintance with the results of his method was prohibited by the barrier of the Russian language. Since Luria is one

of the most prominent Russian psychologists his work will probably be widely read by psychologists. The friendly foreword by Professor A. Meyer will, of course, also interest the psychiatrist. So the book can be looked on as a fourth sign that the breach between the two professions is being mended.

Primarily the significance of Luria's work is a methodological one, although his factual contributions are by no means few or unimportant. I will hence deal briefly with each in the following lines. Luria's greatest contribution is his method for studying the dynamics of emotional conflict in its coordinated motor response. Before he was able to devise such a method, however, he was forced to consider the theory of organized behavior. Before he was able to set up his working hypothesis he was forced to define precisely the concepts with which he wished to operate. His general mode of attack is what Lewin calls the "constructive" method. The constructive method follows logically and chronologically the following three steps: (1) precise definition of concepts (*strenge Begriffsbildung*), (2) the manufacture of a working hypothesis, (3) its experimental verification or invalidation. Of the hundreds of workers on emotion, Lewin and Luria have been the only two to use this method consistently and have hence, in my estimation at least, made the most important contributions of contemporary psychologists to our knowledge of emotion.

In using this method Luria first defines his concepts in terms of a theory of organization. (Here his viewpoint is very near that of Lewin and the Gestalt theory.) He adopts the configurational hypothesis because he sees the sterility of the atomistic attack on emotion and clearly realizes that the numerous physiological, psychogalvanical and other recent atomistic attacks have resulted in little more than confusion. (Luria's knowledge of the world literature is to be commended. Few contemporary psychologists are so at home with the writings of their foreign colleagues.) Then he develops a theory. If his views regarding organization are correct, psychological conflict in the thought processes must manifest itself in a simultaneously performed voluntary motor activity. In this motor activity or particularly in its organization he sees the chance of studying the dynamic structure of the conflict situation. Finally he experiments and finds a striking confirmation of his hypothesis. Where less "constructively thought through" attacks on the physiological concomitants of emotion have resulted in paradox and confusion, Luria's experimental attack becomes strikingly fruitful. The details of his

method are to be found in his book or in his article, "Die Methode der Abbilden den Motorik" (*Psychol. Forsch.*, 1929, 12, 127-179). Luria's greatest contribution seems to me to be in the application of the "constructive" method to the psychology of emotion. In our attempts at pure empiricism, dominated by the false methodology of positivistic materialism, we have lost sight of *the* scientific method. Thoughtful study of how Galileo or Newton actually attacked their problems will convince the reader that the "constructive" method is also the method of physics. Newton adopted the motto "hypotheses non fingo" strangely enough, while he was setting up the most daring working hypothesis of all times, *i.e.*, universal gravitation. Despite Dr. Watson's blustering dictum of "Feed me facts," what we need in psychology is more rather than less theory. On this point Luria's work is convincing.

With his method established, Luria uncovers an impressive array of facts and the beginnings of some laws about the dynamics of conflict. He studies emotional conflict in students confronted with examinations, in criminals (chiefly murders), in situations where the conflict is induced in hypnosis, in artificially aroused neuroses, in aphasic patients, etc. The possibility of creating real conflict situations in the laboratory is particularly intriguing. He develops a theory of the "functional barrier" which receives confirmation in his researches on the ontogenetic development of organized behavior, on hysterical patients and on the mentally deficient. Finally, he treats briefly of the possibility of controlling behavior by his principles and discusses their possible therapeutic value. The detail of all of this I must leave unmentioned. Every psychologist primarily interested in abnormal behavior will sooner or later read this book. All psychologists could read it with profit.

In my enthusiasm for Luria's work I do not wish to create the impression that we now know everything about emotional conflict. Far from it. Comparison of Luria's work with many of the more facile and simple theories of emotion may result in disappointment. These theories, such as Watson's conditioned reflex theory of emotional genesis make plausible material for the sophomore student but they do not satisfy the professional psychologist in his search for real dynamic laws. Luria himself realizes that at the most we have made a promising beginning. He sums up his researches by saying:

"The former empirical psychology failed in the examination of the individual psychological processes and the behavior of the living, concrete personality. Will and intellect were considered as separate

entities, and the latter was not seen as the key to the development of will. Simple motor phenomena, associations, emotions and strivings, thinking and speech were subjects of special divisions of psychology, usually relegated to the final chapters of the text-book to illustrate the laws previously described.

"We may consider that the preliminary period in the development of psychology has been passed. Psychology finds itself in a great crisis, and what had been formerly studied apart as independent isolated activities are not investigated in their functional relations to one another. The behavior of the human adult is primarily a product of complex growth, which cannot be comprehended as an accumulation of experiences. . . .

"To understand human behavior in its destruction and organization without these cultural, psychological mechanisms is impossible, for destruction would be but a sum of physiological symptoms, and organization only a dictionary of terms. In the analysis of the neurodynamical phenomena we should like to defend the psychological method; beginning to work with psychophysiological facts, we have come to their psychological interpretation. The analysis of the complex cultural mechanisms is the key to the understanding of the simple neurodynamical processes. We have done this with only a few of the psychophysiological processes, but we are convinced that this system of investigation answers many of the riddles of human psychology."

I agree with Luria. We psychologists might even conclude with a chuckle of satisfaction that psychology today is on a firmer scientific basis than neurophysiology itself. At least we do not have to be always on a somewhat apologetic defensive.

The American edition of Luria's work has much to commend it and at the same time leaves much to be desired. The difficulty most of us found in Pavlov's lectures because of the limited tables and lack of detailed experimental evidence will not be met here. Sufficient tables, introspective protocols, and kymographic records are produced to convince the reader of the reliability of the method. Concerning the adequacy of the translation I can say nothing as I know no Russian. The English, however, is pedantic, clumsy, and at times almost incomprehensible. Even in their context, it is amazingly difficult to make any sense out of sentences like the following: "Human psychology differs from the zoölogical point of view in that it sees specific laws absent in the phenomena of nature and characteristic of history" (p. 428). There are many such sentences

scattered through the book. One might suspect that the translator has been inclined to follow the Russian text all too literally and with perhaps a not too adequate dictionary. Certainly Luria's German papers would not convince one that he is an unbelievably clumsy stylist. There are numerous misprints and errors of editing throughout the work. Many of these are minor. The names of certain German authors, for instance, have obviously been retranscribed into Roman type from the Russian with resulting disagreement. Ovsiankina hence becomes Ousjanken. The titles of Russian papers are given throughout in English translations without specifically stating this practice. Hence until one checks up it is by no means clear what is English and what Russian. To find our old friend the ass of Buridan referred to as "the classic Buridanov ass" is simply amusing and adds a little Russian local color. Other mistakes are more exasperating. For instance, in the very important Fig. 6, A and B of the accompanying legend are undoubtedly reversed. This fact is not obvious until the reader has puzzled some time over the text. Likewise the legend accompanying Fig. 114 should be reversed to be clear and consistent. Such deficiencies in the work, however, pale into insignificance when one considers its very great importance. Certainly both the publishers and Dr. Gannet are to be congratulated on making Luria's work available to the American psychologist, particularly in these times of financial stress when such an obviously expensive venture might have had to wait years for a publisher.

J. F. BROWN.

University of Kansas.

ROSSMAN, JOSEPH. *The Psychology of the Inventor*. Washington, D. C.: The Inventors Publishing Company, 1931. Pp. x+252. New and revised edition.

There is at present considerable interest in all aspects of creative thinking. A valuable specific treatment of the mental processes of the inventor, his actual methods of inventing, and the motives impelling him to invent will be found in this book by Rossman, whose preparation for writing it includes several years as Patent Examiner in the United States Patent Office. Rossman has, moreover, received valuable first-hand information for his book from a group of some seven hundred well-known inventors, from five hundred questionnaires sent to patent attorneys in the United States, and from three hundred questionnaires sent to directors of research and development departments of American corporations and companies.

The author's technological interest in invention has led him to

discuss with great precision such points as what constitutes invention, how it differs from closely allied activities, and for what particular forms an inventor may be granted a patent. An interesting chapter treats of the psychology of patent law and reveals how many delicate psychological questions are involved in legal decisions.

The characteristics of the inventor are discussed in terms of the traits most frequently mentioned in questionnaire returns from patent attorneys and directors of research. These characteristics are described non-technically and are not particularly significant from the standpoint of psychological analysis. The same criticism may be made on the essentials of success as listed by the inventors themselves. However, the insistence of the inventor upon certain character and temperamental traits is worth noting. Tenacity of purpose, courage, and infinite patience are stressed again and again; and among temperamental traits non-conformity and self-confidence. Originality, imagination, vision (visualization?) are cited as essential intellectual characteristics.

Rossman's logical schema for the actual methods involved in inventing reminds one somewhat of Dewey's formulation in his book, "How We Think." Some reports by individuals concerning their methods of procedure are of practical interest in this connection and contain suggestions that might be utilized in training inventors.

In attempting an analysis of the mental processes of the inventor in psychological terms the author relies upon recognized authorities such as Woodworth and makes little original contribution. Creative activity is conceived as one form of intelligent adaptive behavior. To quote: "The essential psychological feature of invention is a mental trial and error process produced under emotional conditions caused by an unsatisfied desire or need resulting in an adequate act of behavior which satisfies the need." Strong emotional reaction to obstacles characterizes the creative worker; he is intolerant of them. He also manifests an innovating attitude toward his environment which may become an end in itself on account of the extreme satisfaction experienced by means of it. The word "imagination" is shown to be a blanket term covering such activities as those of manipulation, exploration, constructiveness, and make-believe. No sharp lines can be drawn between it and thinking.

The curious habits of creative workers are described by Rossman with citations from Knowlson and from his own inventor-respondents who have much to tell of new mental patterns as the result of flashes of inspiration. Thus, "Ideas come when I least expect them,

often when I am half-asleep or day-dreaming" (R. N. Kircher). And again, "I have had innumerable 'flash' ideas on the order of the invention of fiction" (W. S. H. Hamilton).

Rossman gives some interesting material on chance and accident in invention. They are reported as significant factors only for those individuals who are prepared to take advantage of them. He discusses also multiple invention where the social factor looms large. Given the same problem, the mechanical elements, and the physical limitations, the number of possible practical solutions are limited, and different people will, therefore, arrive at similar conclusions under such circumstances. The author estimates that about 4 per cent of all patent applications filed each year contain multiple inventions. He reviews the somewhat inconclusive evidence that the same inventions have been made by individuals in widely different historic periods. Discussing the occupation of inventors he develops the fact that inventions are frequently made by an amateur in the field. This curious circumstance held particularly in earlier generations, before, that is, a concerted attempt was made by industrialists to develop innovators in their several fields. The outsider approaches a problem with a fresh outlook. Since he is ignorant of the traditions and achievements in the field, he is not bound by precedent; he is not hampered by fear of losing his professional reputation, and, consequently, he is much bolder in projecting solutions to difficulties. Some suggestions may be gleaned from the above as to certain principles to be applied in training creative workers. They must not be subjected to too-rigid a routine nor to mechanical habit-formation.

Rossman reports that children of inventors possess inventiveness to an unusual degree, and that inventors also have inventive relatives, but the difficulty of separating heredity from environment is realized and no attempt is made to evaluate the factors in transmission of inventive ability nor to determine whether there is actually such a thing as racial heredity of inventiveness.

The book is a rich mine of facts for the investigator in the field of creative activity.

JUNE E. DOWNEY.

University of Wyoming.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN BRANCH
OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION

Held in Fort Collins, Colorado, November 25 and 26, 1932

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY, GEO. T. AVERY, *Colorado Agricultural
College*

Through the courtesy of the Colorado-Wyoming Academy of Science arrangements were made for a joint meeting of the psychological section of the Academy and the Colorado branch of the American Psychological Association.

At the business sessions it was voted to unite the Psychological Section of the Academy with the Colorado branch of the American Psychological Association under the name of the Rocky Mountain Branch of the American Psychological Association. The following were elected as officers of the association: Thomas R. Garth, University of Denver, President; Geo. T. Avery, Colorado Agricultural College, Secretary and Treasurer.

The constitution committee reported favorably upon the following constitution which was, after some discussion, adopted unanimously:

CONSTITUTION

Article I—Name and Officers

Section 1. The name of this organization shall be the Rocky Mountain Branch of the American Psychological Association.

Section 2. The officers of the Branch shall consist of a President, a Secretary, and a Treasurer.

Section 3. There shall be a Board of Governors, which shall consist of the above named officers and one additional member.

Section 4. The President, Secretary, and Treasurer shall be elected annually. The President of the preceding term will automatically become a governor for a term of one year.

Article II—Duties of Officers

Section 1. President: The duties of the President shall be to preside at all meetings of the Branch and of the Board of Governors, and to keep a general supervision of affairs of the branch.

Section 2. In the event of the absence of the President, any meeting of the Branch or of the Board of Governors may elect its presiding officers.

Section 3. Secretary: The duties of the Secretary shall be to keep a record of the proceedings of the Branch and safely and systematically to keep all books, papers, records, and documents belonging to the Branch. He shall notify members of their election, and conduct the correspondence of the Branch.

Section 4. Treasurer: The duties of the Treasurer shall be to collect and account for all moneys belonging to the Branch, to disburse the same under the order of the Board of Governors, and to make a written report of the Branch at its annual meeting. All Branch moneys in the custody of the Treasurer shall be deposited in the name of the Rocky Mountain Branch of the American Psychological Association in such bank as shall be designated by the Board of Governors.

Section 5. The President and the Treasurer shall sign all written contracts and checks.

Article III—The Board of Governors

Section 1. The government and management of the Branch are vested in the Board of Governors, which shall have general charge of the affairs and funds of the Branch, and shall formulate such by-laws and rules as may be deemed necessary. It shall be the duty of the Board of Governors to carry out the objects and purposes of the Branch.

Section 2. The Board of Governors shall have a regular meeting once each year, and special meetings at such times as may be determined by the President.

Section 3. The Board of Governors shall fill at its next meeting any vacancy that may occur in its own membership or in any other office of the Branch. Such appointment shall hold until the next meeting.

Article IV—Meetings and Elections

Section 1. The annual meeting of the Branch for the election of officers and governors shall be held each year in November.

Section 2. Nominations shall be made by a nominating committee.

Section 3. Only members of the A.P.A. may hold office.

Article V—Committees

Section 1. The Board of Governors shall annually elect such standing committees and may appoint from time to time such committees as are deemed necessary. These committees may consist wholly or partly of Governors.

Article VI—Membership

Section 1. The membership of the Club shall be members and associates of the American Psychological Association and affiliated associates. Only the first two groups may vote.

Article VII—Dues

Section 1. The annual dues of each member shall be payable the first of November.

Section 2. Members in arrears in payment of dues for six months shall forfeit all rights of membership. Such may be restored to membership by the Board of Governors and by payment of all back dues.

Section 3. Any member absent from the area for four consecutive months may be excused from payment of dues by vote of the Board of Governors.

The committee on resolutions then made the following report:

1. The Colorado-Wyoming Academy of Science, and the American Psychological Association of the Rocky Mountain region have lost one of their most distinguished members in the passing of Dr. June Downey, of the University of Wyoming. She has been versatile and productive in the fields of experimental and social psychology, and has brought signal recognition to the Rocky Mountain region. We wish to express our deep sympathy to both her family and her institution.

2. The members of the Rocky Mountain Branch of the American Psychological Association and the Psychological Section of the Colorado-Wyoming Academy of Science wish to express their appreciation and thanks to the Colorado Agricultural College for the splendid hospitality extended to the visiting members from sister institutions.

BOOKS RECEIVED

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LOUIS VIALLE, *Detresses de Nietzsche*. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1932. Pp. viii+154.

LOUIS VIALLE, *Le Desir du Neant*. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1933. Pp. 748.

SIDNEY M. NEWHALL and ROBERT R. SEARS, *Conditioning Finger Retraction to Visual Stimuli Near the Absolute Threshold*. Comp. Psychol. Monog., January, 1933. Pp. 25.

PAUL E. FIELDS, *Studies in Concept Formation*. Comp. Psychol. Monog., December, 1932. Pp. 70.

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